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TUNNELING IN CHICAGO CLAY: PIONEERING WORK IN GROUND CONTROL  
 
 Edward J. Cording  
Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  






Early in his engineering career, Ralph Peck supervised the soil mechanics investigations during subway construction in the soft clays 
in Chicago, working under the guidance of Karl Terzaghi. A major focus was to determine what should be done to minimize surface 
settlements of the streets.  Squeeze tests, in which clay displacements and construction events in the tunnel were observed, led to 
changes that significantly reduced surface settlement. Squeeze test reports prepared by Peck and his soil mechanics team are 
summarized and selected drawings illustrated. The work provides a first view of Peck’s observational method:  “it demonstrated the 
enormous practical benefits … that may be derived from simple but intelligently interpreted observations.”  Over the past 70 years, it 





From 1939 through 1941, Ralph Peck was Assistant Subway 
Engineer in the Department of Subways and Traction of the 
City of Chicago, Survey Section, supervising the Soil 
Mechanics Laboratory during the construction of the Chicago 
Subway. He was selected by and worked under the guidance 
of Karl Terzaghi, who was consultant to the City.  Ralph 
Burke was chief engineer for the subway work, and Raymond 
Knapp was head of the survey section.  
 
One of the questions that arose early in construction was 
“What should be done to reduce the settlement of the street 
surface to a minimum” (Terzaghi, 1942a).   Answering that 
question became a major part of the work of Ralph Peck and 
his soil mechanics team throughout the subway construction.  
This paper focuses on that work, in particular the series of 
field test sections, termed squeeze tests, they conducted in the 
liner plate tunnels. 
    
Ralph Peck, in presenting the first Stanley D. Wilson lecture, 
in describing the squeeze test data, noted the May 9-12, 1939 
date on the drawing projected on the screen and said “I can 
almost guarantee you that 50 years ago this hour probably I or 
some of my brothers on the soil mechanics team were in the 
tunnel making these measurements.” He described how they 
measured the squeeze of the clay into the tunnel during 
excavation, and related it to the surface settlement. He noted 
that, although the liner plate method had been used to 
construct sewer tunnels in Chicago, and it was recognized that  
 
 
surface subsidence and damage occurred due to tunneling; 
nobody associated construction procedures with specific 
amounts of settlement.  There had been no real understanding 
of the causes of settlement; it was just known that it was 
inevitable that settlement would occur (Peck, 1989).  
 
From the perspective of the tunneling practice prior to 1939,  
the investigations on the Chicago Subway can truly be 
described as pioneering work in ground control.  Looking 
forward from 1939 to the present, the observations made by 
Peck take on added significance, because they set a standard 
for integrated field investigations relating tunneling 
procedures to ground loss and surface settlement.  The work 
had an even broader significance for geotechnical engineering. 
As Peck stated “The Chicago Subway project in the annals of 
geotechnical engineering assumed an importance far beyond 
its benefits at the time, largely because it demonstrated the 
enormous practical benefits that occur from even crude 
observations, crude at least in comparison to today’s 
sophisticated instrumentation.  Even today, it exemplifies the 
benefits that may be derived from simple but intelligently 
interpreted observations” (Peck, 1999).    
 
Several investigations of ground movements around soft 
ground tunnels that have built on the standard set in 1939 are 
described at the end of the paper. The projects used more 
sophisticated  instrumentation, but, most importantly, the 
ground movements were intelligently interpreted and 
correlated with  detailed observation of construction 
conditions.  Observations have now gone from measuring, 
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timing, and recording construction events in notebooks to 
assembling and comparing digital records of key machine 
functions and correlating them with continuous records of 
ground movements and piezometric levels, which show how a 
pressurized envelope is maintained around pressurized face 
shields so that ground movements can be controlled to 
negligible values.  
  
In addition to Peck’s lectures and published papers by Peck, 
Terzaghi, and Knapp, I have drawn from a volume containing 
carbon copies and blue prints of the squeeze test reports 
prepared by Peck and his assistants (Soil Mechanics 
Laboratory, 1939-1941. The reports provide detailed 
descriptions of the construction conditions affecting ground 
movements. Portions of drawings from the volume are 
presented as figures in this paper. 
 
What stands out in reviewing the squeeze reports is the level 
of relevant detail in the recorded observations. Over the 
almost 3-year construction period on the Chicago Subway, 
Peck applied the observational method in solving subway 
construction problems. The content and organization of the 
squeeze reports and drawings, and the way he worked on the 
braced excavations (Peck, 1942) and other aspects of the 
Chicago subway project provided a first view of the 
engineering approach that has been so apparent to those who 
later studied and worked with him --- integration of theory and 
practice; use of precedents; field observations.  He later 
formalized the observational method, but, more importantly, 
he was always observing --- the ground, construction 
conditions, ground behavior and response of structures.  He 
has stated that “the most valuable instrument is an observant 
eye coupled to an inquiring mind.” 
 
 
THE CHICAGO SUBWAY INVESTIGATIONS BEGIN 
 
Ralph Peck in his paper “Karl Terzaghi and the Chicago 
Subway” (1975), not only describes Terzaghi’s role but his 
own participation, early in his engineering career, in these 
pioneering investigations. Additional, fascinating insights can 
be obtained by referring to the volume edited by John 
Dunnicliff and Nancy Peck Young (2006) in which  Peck 
describes how he and Marjorie Peck arrived in Chicago and 
the work began.   
 
In December 1938, as construction was beginning on the 
Chicago Subway, Karl Terzaghi gave a lecture in Chicago 
entitled “The Dangers of Constructing Subways in Soft Clay 
Beneath Large Cities.” His previous experience with the soft 
clays around the Great Lakes was on the excavation of piers in 
plastic clay for the foundations of Hudson’s Store in Detroit.  
However, his descriptions of the consequences of tunneling 
were so graphic (Peck noted that he figuratively scared the 
audience to death)  that he found both the State Street Property 
Owners Association and the Department of Subways and 
Traction of the City of Chicago seeking his services. He chose 
the City, and had three requirements:  (1) City to establish a 
soil mechanics laboratory, (2) Laboratory to be supervised by 
an individual chosen by him and working under his 
supervision, (3) Fee of $100 per day. Terzaghi’s fee was 
greater than permitted by City rules so Ralph Burke had to go 
before the city council to gain approval, which resulted in it 
being picked up by the Chicago newspapers, bringing him and 
soil mechanics to the community’s attention (Peck, 1975).  
 
At the time, Ralph Peck was at Harvard University, studying 
under Arthur Casagrande and assisting in the soil mechanics 
laboratory, after completing his PhD in structural engineering 
at Rensselaer University and working for part of a year as a 
structural detailer for American Bridge Company.  Terzaghi,  
on Casagrande’s advice, chose Peck to supervise the lab.  
 
Although the Chicago Subway construction was underway 
when Peck arrived on January 17, 1939, the boring program 
that included the sampling and soil testing required by 
Terzaghi, had only recently begun, so this occupied the 
immediate efforts of the Soil Mechanics Laboratory. Peck 
supervised a team of young engineers selected from City 
applicants,  preferably those who had master’s degrees or had 
taken a course in soil mechanics.  Two-in.-dia. seamless 
Shelby tubes were obtained from the borings and, later,  block 
samples and water content samples were collected from the 
tunnels.. Testing was focused on unconfined compression tests 
and water contents  to evaluate  stiffness and yield strength of 
the clay and the details of its vertical and lateral variability.  
 
 
CHICAGO SUBWAY ALIGNMENT 
 
Most of the Chicago Subway alignment was at a depth to 
tunnel crown of 25 feet.  One of the reasons for such a shallow 
tunnel depth compared to current subway projects is 
understood when you realize that access to the subway is by 
walking down stairs, rather than riding escalators. Another 
positive effect of the shallow depth was that the heave and 
settlement troughs due to tunneling were largely contained 
within the street and sidewalk right of way and had less impact 
on buildings. Additionally, the work rules for compressed air 
pressures in the tunnel made it more expensive to tunnel at 
more than 15 psi, and the air pressures less than 15 psi were 
not able to fully balance the higher stresses  at depth.  
 
There were difficulties and challenges  with the shallower 
tunnel depth. The medium to very soft Chicago Clay (CL to 
CH), extends from a depth of approximately 20 to 60 feet over 
much of downtown Chicago. The clay was deposited as 
Deerfield and Blodgett Tills beneath glacial Lake Chicago in 
the later stages of the Wisconsinan Glaciation as the ice 
receded into the Lake Michigan basin. In downtown Chicago 
(South of the Chicago River, largely within the Loop) the 
shallow depth put the full tunnel face in the soft clay whereas 
north of the Chicago River the lower portion of the tunnel was 
in older, overconsolidated stiff to hard clay tills.  
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One of Terzaghi’s early questions was which tunnels could be 
constructed by means of the light liner-plate method and 
where it would be necessary to use the more expensive shield 
method ($270/ft of tube versus $580/ft of tube, respectively). 
 
Eight-ft-wide freight tunnels had been constructed at the turn 
of the century in downtown Chicago with vertical sidewalls on 
the soft clay bottom using compressed air and daily casting of 
the concrete lining up to the face.  Sewer tunnels had been 
constructed in Chicago with the liner plate method for the 
previous twenty years.  However, it was concluded that the 
larger subway tunnels could not be constructed by the liner 
plate method in downtown Chicago. Terzaghi’s analysis 
showed that the bearing capacity of the soft clay beneath the 
side wall foot blocks was too low to safely support the post 
loads from the larger subway tunnels (Terzaghi, 1942a). 
 
Thus, in downtown Chicago, on Contract S-3 on State Street 
and on Contract D-1 on the Dearborn Street Line, tunneling 
was accomplished with the shield method. North of the 
Chicago River, on contracts D-3 and D-5 on the Dearborn 
Street Line, and S4b, S-5, S-6, and S-7 on the State Street 
Line, the liner plate method was used, because the stiff to hard 
clays in the invert provided bearing for the vertical posts. In 
both projects, compressed air was used with air pressures kept 
to less than 15 psi.  In Fig 1, running tunnels are shown in red, 
tunneled stations in blue, and braced cuts in green.  River 
crossings were dredged for immersed tubes. 
 
 Fig.1: Chicago Subway construction contracts, 1939-1941 





In downtown Chicago, the shallow tunnel depth not only 
placed the shield tunnels within the soft clay but also directly 
in the path of the 8-ft-wide freight tunnels located down the 
center of every major street. The tunnels were demolished 
ahead of the advancing shields, removing the concrete and 
filling the tunnels with sand, which typically resulted in 
settlement of 0.5 to 2 inches.   
Doors on the face of the shield occupied up to 20% of the area 
of the face (Fig.2).  Through these doors the soft clay 
squeezed as the shield was shoved forward.  As the shield was 
advanced the effort was to hold the heave of the street surface 
to less than four inches.  Heave of sidewalk vaults was 
reduced by filling them with 4 feet of sandbags. Harder clays 
or other obstructions, such as occasional temporary timber 
support in the abandoned freight tunnel, passing through the 
shield doors could restrict flow and cause additional heave, 
which was controlled largely by mining out ahead of the doors 
to relieve pressures. The 3-in. gap between the tail of the 
shield and lining was filled with pea gravel. The heave was 
followed by an even larger settlement due to consolidation of 
the clay with time following passage of the shield.  Figure 3 
shows (A) heave of 0.16 feet as the first shield passes 
followed by (B) rapid settlement of 0.12 feet over a period of 
11 days (some likely due to ground loss at the tail) then (C) 
0.3 feet of heave as the second shield passes, followed, over a 
period of 6 months, by (D) a settlement that dropped the street 
surface 0.5 feet below its original level (Terzaghi, 1942b).   
                
Fig. 2:  Shield tunnel on Contracts S 3 and D-1                 
(after Terzaghi, 1942b) 
 
              
     A.  Day 1: (7-19-40): Heave as 1st shield passes  
      B. ~Day 11: Position of street surface immediately prior to 2nd  shield  
     C. Day 12: (8-1-40): Position of street surface at time of  
 maximum  heave due to 2nd shield passage 
     D. Day 195: (1-30-41) Position of street surface prior to air removal  
.   
Fig. 3: Chicago Subway shield tunnel: heave and settlement 
(after Terzaghi, 1942b) 
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Terzaghi (1942b) attributed the consolidation to remolding of 
the clay in a thin zone around the perimeter of the shield. 
More recent experience in Chicago clay, monitoring 
piezometers and extensometers around advancing shields 
shows that consolidation will occurs as a result of stress 
increases due to the shoving, which can be first exhibited as an 
excess pore pressure, beginning as much as 4 diameters ahead 
of the shield in a zone of influence of several diameters around 
the tunnel, with consolidation occurring as the excess pore 
pressure dissipates. Additionally, if the lining is permeable, 
additional consolidation occurs due to drainage into the tunnel 
as pore pressures drop below ambient levels and effective 
stresses  increase (Kawamura and Cording, 1999). 
 
 
LINER PLATE TUNNELS 
 
Liner plate tunnels were constructed north of downtown 
Chicago (North of the Chicago River and the Loop),  In this 
region, the depth of the soft clay thinned so that the lower 
portion of the tunnel face transitioned from the soft clay into 
older stiff to hard clay tills. This allowed the use of the less 
expensive basket-shaped liner-plate tunnels in which the 
tunnel arch was supported on posts along the sidewalls 
standing on wooden foot blocks in the stiffer clay bottom. The 
tunnels were sequentially excavated by hand mining, first 
advancing the top face and installing the steel rib arch on 2-ft 
2-in. centers with liner plates set between the flanges.  
 
 
            
 
Fig. 4: Photo of sequential excavation (liner plate tunnel)  
 
Figure 4 shows the labor intensive operation (there are 15 
miners in the picture).  Miners cut the clay into sausage-like 
pieces, using a clay knife consisting of a loop of steel with a 
mechanical assist provided by a cable extending to a drum on 
an air tugger.  For each of the miners, there were typically two 
loaders to carry the clay and dump it in muck cars. In the arch, 
the liner plate was bolted to the previous ring, which provided 
immediate cantilever support, and the new arch rib was 
temporarily supported on the floor of the top face by foot 
blocks and radial timber braces.  The radial braces were 
setting on the soft clay surface and were close the vertical 
intermediate face, and therefore had the potential for allowing 
settlement of the tunnel crown.  
 
The timber braces and foot blocks  in the top face were 
removed as the intermediate face was advanced and load from 
the arch rib was transferred to the ribs on the side walls. These 
processes of support, excavation, and re-support resulted in 
further settlement. The invert section and the bottom lateral 
braces against the invert section were left in place until just 
before the concrete invert was placed (Fig. 5).  
 
Throughout, air pressure was typically maintained at 12 to 14 
psi, which provided some support of the tunnel face and arch 
and reduced the loads on the footings beneath the sidewall 
posts.  The air pressure also limited movement  of the clay into 
the tunnel.  As noted in the squeeze reports, often the gap 
between the clay and the installed lining was not filled 
promptly so that the clay was not in contact with the lining 
and the air pressure was the sole internal support until the clay 
surface came in contact with the lining. In some cases, where 
harder clays were present near the bottom, the liner plate was 
not extended to the bottom of the side wall.  
 
A typical day’s advance would be 20 to 30 feet. Pouring of a 
concrete invert and concrete arch could follow as closely as 
the following shift or day; however, on State Street, near  
Chicago Ave, the liner plate tunnel heading on Contract S-5 
was 60 to 150 feet ahead of the arch concreting operation in 
all four headings, which contributed to the large settlements 
that developed over a distance of  Xxxx when blowouts into 
utilities in the street caused a loss of air pressure to 9-10 psi. 
        
              
     
Fig. 5: Sequential heading and bench excavation , 
liner plate tunnel on Contract  S 5 (Terzaghi, 1942a) 
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SQUEEZE TESTS: RELATING CONSTRUCTION TO 
GROUND LOSS AND SETTLEMENT   
 
At the time of his December, 1938 lecture, Terzaghi visited an 
access tunnel being driven from a construction shaft to the line 
of the subway tunnel. He suggested to the resident engineer 
that the cause of the surface settlements be investigated by 
driving spearheads attached to wires ahead of the tunnel face 
to determine if the clay was displacing into the tunnel 
excavation during mining.  He was provided with the results 
on his first consulting visit, in late January, 1939, which 
showed as much as 0.2 feet of displacement toward the tunnel 
face as the tunnel heading was advanced (Peck, 1975).  
 
In Terzaghi’s early visits, he discussed with Raymond Knapp 
and Ralph Peck guidelines for “squeeze tests” to measure  
ground movements into the tunnel as the excavation stages 
were advanced.  Peck proceeded to set up and conduct the 
squeeze tests.  The first four squeeze tests, in the period April 
through August, 1939, were carried out on Contract S-5, the 
first tunnel section mined on State Street north of the River.  
 
Observations were carried out continuously over a period of 
24 to 72 hours during the multiple stages of excavation and 
support as the tunnel was advanced.  In a typical squeeze test, 
spearheads were driven into the clay approximately 6 to 10 
feet ahead of the excavation face to measure axial                                                                                                                                     
displacements into the tunnel as the heading was advanced to 
the location of the spearhead.  Rods were embedded 2 feet into 
the clay in the crown of the tunnel to measure crown 
settlement and into the clay at several locations in both walls 
of the tunnel to measure the horizontal displacement across the 
width of the tunnel using a tape measure.   
 
At the same time, settlements were surveyed across the width 
of the street every 20 feet along the alignment.. Samples were 
taken in the tunnel to determine the profile of water content 
and strength. Throughout, the details of the excavation and 
support procedures and the location and timing of the multiple 
excavation stages were recorded.  Peck summarized the results 
on a single blueprint showing a profile and cross-section of the 
tunnel excavation sequences and displacements of the clay 
into the tunnel with time, a profile of the clay strength and 
water content and surface settlement profiles (Soil Mechanics 
Laboratory, 1939-1941). Figure 6 shows a portion of the 
information recorded on the drawing for the fourth (August 
14-15, 1939) squeeze test. (Crown settlements are highlighted 
in red, and wall closure in purple, with their locations circled 
shown on the cross section and longitudinal profile of 
excavation progress.) 
 
On Terzaghi’s next visit, Peck presented him with the 
blueprint for the April, 1939 squeeze test accompanied by a 
narrative of the construction events and test procedures.  Peck 
has commented in several lectures and papers that Terzaghi 
“concealed his pleasure at the results with some difficulty,” 
and he noted the growing respect and confidence that
Terzaghi, Peck, and Knapp had in their collaborative effort 
(Peck, 1975).  
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YOU SHOULD ASSUME THE DATA IS RIGHT  
UNTILYOU HAVE PROVEN THAT IT IS WRONG 
 
Geotechnical engineers are well aware of how Peck used his 
lectures not only to communicate lessons learned but to point 
the way to the future of the profession.  His lecture upon 
receiving the Distinguished Alumnus Award from the 
University of Illinois College of Engineering was entirely 
dedicated to describing the lessons he had learned from his 
mistakes.  Few geotechnical engineers would voluntarily give 
such a lecture.  
 
In his lectures on the Chicago Subway squeeze tests, including 
the Wilson Lecture in 1989, Peck described the lesson he 
learned from Terzaghi regarding the interpretation of the 
squeeze test data.  For all four squeeze test sections conducted 
on Contract S-5 (from April through August, 1939), Peck had 
drawn smooth curves through the data for crown settlement 
and sidewall closure.  Fig. 6 shows the data for the August 14-
15, 1939 squeeze test. 
 
In September, 1939, Terzaghi prepared a long report in which 
he evaluated the squeeze test data. Instead of smooth curves, 
he re-plotted the curves to go through the data points 
(illustrated by the red lines added to the crown settlement in 
Figure 7). (The distances of the faces ahead of the crown 
settlement point are also shown in red.) Peck had argued that 
difficulty in making the measurements caused variations on 
the order of + 1/4 of an inch, which did not represent real 
behavior. Terzaghi showed that  there was a consistent 
reversal of displacements.  As excavation was carried 
downward and the walls moved in, the tunnel would oval and 
crown would temporarily displace upward.  Similarly, with 
further advance of the headings, downward movement of the 
crown would cause a temporary outward wall movement, 
often occurring at the same time at different locations in the 
tunnel section, which was considered indicative of a sudden 
yielding of the clay.  
                                     
 
 
Fig. 7: Contract S-5, August 14-15, 1939  replotting of crown     
settlement curves to go through all data points.  
Peck concluded his lectures with the advice he received from 
Terzaghi:  “You should assume the data is right until you have 
proven that it is wrong.”    
 
 
CONTRACT S-5: THE CAUSES OF LARGE SURFACE  
SETTLEMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED 
 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 were all obtained from the large drawing 
Peck prepared for the August 14-15, 1939 squeeze test at 
Station 172.  Figure 8 shows the surface settlements.  
                                          
 
 





Contract S-5, August 14-15, 1939  (2
nd
 tube squeeze test).    
 
This squeeze test was conducted in the north heading of the 
Northbound (NB) tube, which was the second of the twin 
tubes mined at this location.  The two tubes were built 
immediately adjacent to each other, with a common central 
wall. The first (SB) tube had produced a settlement of 5 in.  
The additional surface settlement of the NB tube on August 
14-15 was 2.2 in. (Fig. 8).    
 
The second tube of the twin tube sections on Contract S-5 
(where tubes were constructed immediately adjacent to each 
other) produced lesser settlements than the first tube because 
there were no lateral displacements at the wall of the second 
tube that was adjacent to the first tube and the loads over the 
second tube arched onto the concrete lining of the first tube so 
that there was no soil to be compressed at that side of the 
tunnel.  (On Contract D-3 and D-5, where tubes were 
separated, by approximately 8 feet, the settlement of the 2
nd
 
tube was larger than the 1
st
 due to compression of the pillar). 
 
The squeeze tests in the NB tunnel corresponding to the 2.2-
in. surface settlement are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The  
crown settlement for the second tube was 3 inches which 
began as the crown rib was excavated, when the  timber braces 
supporting the steel arch in the tunnel crown would have been 
removed. The maximum side wall closure was 7/8 in.  
 
 Paper No. RBP-5              7 
Throughout, Peck used the squeeze test measurements to 
compute the volume lost (VL) into the tunnel and compare it to 
the volume of the surface settlement trough (VS) and found 
that the values were equivalent, an indication that the ground 
movements into the tunnel were the cause of surface 
settlement. (For the August 14-15, 1939 squeeze test, is 
estimated at 13.3 cu ft/ft for the 1st, SB tube.  For the 2nd, NB 
tube, VS was 6.8 cu ft/ft, which is close to VL of 5.2 cu ft/ft 
measured with the squeeze tests in the second tube.  
Additional squeeze that may occur prior to establishing the 
points in the tunnel is not included in calculation of VL.) 
 
Large displacements into the tunnel and large surface 
settlements were also measured in the other three squeeze tests 
conducted on Contract S-5 between April and August, 1939. 
The squeeze test reports showed that much of the settlement 
was occurring as the arch ribs were undermined and re-
supported.  Additionally, a large gap and incomplete filling 
between the erected liner plate and clay was allowing inward 
displacement of the clay,  
 
 
CONTRACT S-6: SETTLEMENTS REDUCED BY 
ADDITION OF A MONKEY DRIFT & WALL BEAM  
 
Based on the observations on Contract S-5, the excavation 
sequence on Contract S-6 and all other subsequent tunnel 
contracts was changed to include a wall beam placed in two 




Fig. 9: 21- x 20-ft Liner plate tunnel with monkey drift  
 
The monkey drifts were approximately 3.5 ft wide by 5 ft high 
and located at the base of the arch. They were mined ahead of 
the crown face (usually referred to as a top heading) so that a 
continuous wall beam could be installed before the crown face 
was excavated (Fig. 9 and 10).  Then, as the crown face was 
excavated, the steel rib arch was set directly on the wall beam. 
Thus, as the side drifts and intermediate and lower faces were 
excavated beneath the arch, the wall beam would span the 
excavation increment and support the arch so that the posts 
could be placed below the wall beam.  Once the intermediate 
face had been excavated, a 10x10-in. timber strut was 
extended across the excavation to prevent inward movement 
of the side walls.     
 
                   
 
Fig. 10: Monkey drift & wall plate. 
 
Figure 11, is an 8-1/2 by 11 blue print prepared by Chester P. 
Siess for the squeeze tests on Contract S-6, at Station 201+40 
during passage of the 2
nd
 (NB) tube,  South heading, March 
27-29, 1940. (Siess was a member of Peck’s team and a 
specialist in the use of the Whittemore gauge, a mechanical 
gauge used to determine stresses from measurement of 
displacements over a gauge length on steel sections.  He went 
on to earn his PhD and to specialize in reinforced concrete 
structures, becoming Professor and Head of the University of 




Fig. 11: Squeeze test for liner plate tunnel with monkey drifts 
Contract S-6 Sta. 202+00 to 202+40, 2
nd
 (NB) Tube, S. Head.  
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Cross sections at 20-foot intervals in the street showed only 
small settlements:  0.8-in. settlement for the 1st, SB tube and 
an additional settlement of 0.5 in. as the 2
nd
, NB tube passed 
during the squeeze test. The squeeze measurements in the NB 
tubel also showed small displacements. Crown settlement was 
7/8 in. and lateral closure between the side walls ranged from 
3/8 in. to 1/8 in. from top to the bottom of the wall.   
 
(The surface settlement volume (VS for the 1
st
, SB tube is 
estimated as 2.7 cu ft/ft.  Vs for the 2
nd
, NB tube is 1.3 cu ft/ft, 
approximately equal to VL estimated from the squeeze tests. 
The 2
nd
 tube was excavated immediately adjacent to the first 





      b. 2
nd




  tubes  
Fig 12:  Maximum surface settlements,  
      Contracts S-5 and S- 6 (after Terzaghi, 1942a) 
 
Fig. 12 shows the dramatic reduction in the maximum surface 
settlement on a 600-ft section of the S-6 contract, excavated 
with the monkey drift and wall beam (Terzaghi, 1942a).   
Settlements for the 1
st
 tubes ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 in., 
whereas  the adjacent 850-ft section of the S-5 contract 
excavated without the monkey drift had surface settlements in 
the range of 3 to 6 in. (Fig. 12a).  
 
On both of these contract sections, the tunnels were in a twin 
tube configuration where the second tunnel was excavated 
immediately adjacent to the first, so that, on both contracts, the 
2
nd
 tube had smaller settlements. For the 2nd tube settlements 
on Contract S-6, which had the monkey drift and wall beam, 
were in the range of 1 to 1.5 in., which were less than the 2 to 
5 in. settlements on Contract S-5 where there was no monkey 
drift (Fig. 12b). 
 
 
CONTRACTS D-5 AND D-3: EFFECT OF TUNNEL 
DEPTH ON GROUND MOVEMENTS 
 
As the liner plate tunnels were extended to the north on 
Contract Sections S-6, S-7, D-3, and D-5, the Soil Mechanics 
Laboratory continued to conduct squeeze tests, confirming the 
beneficial effects of the monkey drift in reducing settlements, 
but the Laboratory was also being relied upon to investigate 
and help resolve problems where large settlements were 
occurring despite the use of the monkey drift.  
 
Ralph Peck, at the request of Ralph Burke, Chief Subway 
Engineer, investigated and reported on the factors producing 
settlements of excessive magnitude over the south heading of 
the NB (1
st
) tube of Contract D3.  The large displacements 
started at Sta. 126, where the tunnel crown was 58 feet deep, 
and increased in magnitude to Sta. 123 as the tunnel dropped 
in elevation to pass beneath the Chicago River to the south. 
Squeeze tests and observations were made at Sta. 126 on Nov 
29-Dec 1, 1939 and supplemental observations were made at 
Sta. 123 on Dec 18-19, 1939.  At Sta. 126, Peck observed 
ground movements and construction conditions contributing to 
the large ground movements: “Energetic motion was observed 
in all portions of the heading” in spite of the fact that the clay 
at tunnel depth had unconfined compressive strength (UCS) 
varying from 1.3 to 3.5 tsf.  Squeeze tests showed inward 
movement of the tunnel face of 0.4 in., tunnel crown 
settlement of 1.2 in., and lateral wall convergence of 1 in.  
Maximum surface settlement was 2.3 in. in 24 hours, 
increasing to 3 in. in two weeks. Peck concluded that 48 to 66 
% of the displacements occurred ahead of the face. (Soil 
Mechanics Laboratory, Dec 19, 1939 report). 
 
Peck’s report describes the causes of the large settlement: As 
was noted in earlier squeeze test reports, an excessive gap of 2 
to 7 in. was being mined outside the lining in the crown and 
there was a delay in filling it. (On a later contract, a simple 
wooden template was extended ahead of the last rib to locate 
the required excavation perimeter and limit over-excavation 
during mining.)  Filling of the gap could be accomplished by 
placement of pea gravel, cement grout, or wood wedges.  At 
Sta. 126, pea gravel was being blown by air to fill the gap 
between clay and the liner plates in the crown but was being 
delayed as much as 18 feet behind the advancing crown face.  
This meant that the clay squeeze was being initially balanced 
by compressed air pressure alone and not supported by the 
tunnel lining until the gap was closed.  
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Additionally Peck noted that the intermediate face was being 
held back as much as 9 ribs (approximately 19 feet), which 
delayed the installation of the strut between the wall plates 
(Fig. 9), so there was no restraint to prevent inward movement 
of the wall beams in the monkey drifts, and liner plate was not 
being placed on the wall behind the wall beams to spread the 
lateral load and reduce squeezing of the clay. 
 
Ground losses in the D-3 NB tunnel at Sta. 126 to 122 were 
much larger than those in the D-3 SB tunnel at Sta. 122 (Table 
1), even though the same tunneling methods were being used, 
and both tunnels were being mined by the same crews, who 
alternated between headings with the concrete crews. Peck 
concluded that the difference was due to the increased depth 
and correspondingly higher stresses around the NB tunnel. 
Procedures acceptable under ordinary conditions (at the 25-
foot depth) must be drastically modified when the conditions 
change.  He noted that settlements of 1.5 to 2 in. were 
inevitable because movements ahead of the face could not be 
reduced without increased air pressure, but that settlements 
due to displacements in the crown and sidewalls   could be 
reduced by (a) accurate, close excavation to reduce gap 
between clay and liner plate, (b) immediate pea gravel 
grouting and vibratory compaction between clay and liner 
plate, (c) reducing length of intermediate face to a few feet so 
that horizontal strut could be placed immediately, (d) placing 
liner plate behind the wall beams to reduce the pressure of the 
clay against the wall beam.  
 
Table 1 has been compiled from the squeeze reports and 
compares ground movements for the deep D-3 and S-4b 
tunnels driven south toward the river with the S-5 and S-6 
tunnels and the shallower D-5 tunnels to the north.  
 
Table 1:  Influence of Tunnel Depth, D,  
on Surface Settlement, Ss 
 




OSR          Settlement      
Normal 25’ tube depth Crn Ss Vs% 
S5: 172 1st 25’ 12 0.4 4.6 3” 3-6” 4.9% 
S6: 180 1st 25’ 12 0.5 2.8  2” 1.6% 
Shallow tubes, near N end       
D5:209 1st NB 16’ 9.5 0.45 1.4 0” 0.3” 0.2% 
D5:207 2nd SB 19’ 9 0.5 2.2 1” 1.1” 0.8% 
D5:207 1st NB 19’ 9 0.5 2.2  0.9” 0.6% 
Deep tubes S toward River       
D3: 126 1st NB 58’ 14 1.2 4.3 1.3” 2-3” 3.1% 
D3: 122 1st NB 61’ 12 1 5.9  5” 7.2% 
D3: 122 2nd SB 37’ 12 0.5 5.7 1.7” 1.3” 1.3% 
D3: 118 1st NB 65’ 12 1 6.4 1.2” 1.2” 1.8% 
S4b:134 1st NB 44’ 12 0.5 7.5  6” 6.9% 
S4b:134 2nd SB 44’ 12 0.5 7.5 1.8” 2” 2.3% 
 
Key: Depth to crown: D; Air pressure: Pa; Unconfined 
compressive strength: UCS, (upper face); Overstress ratio in 
upper face: OSR = (h – pa)/0.5UCS: h: overburden stress. 
OSR in excess of 6 indicates bearing failure & squeezing 
(Peck, 1969).Crown settlement: Crn; Max. surface settlement: 
Ss; Volume settlement trough: Vs% (% of  tunnel volume) 
 
The squeeze tests in Contract S-5 had large ground losses 
(Vs% = 5%) which were reduced to less than 2% on Contract 
S-6 when the monkey drift was used to minimize settlement of 
the tunnel crown. The effects of tunnel depth and high 
overstress ratio (OSR) can also be seen in Table 1. Vs% was 
less than 1% for Contract D-5 near the north end of the 
Dearborn Street tunnels, where tunnel depth was only 16 to 19 
feet, and the OSR was low (in the range of 1.4 to 2.2). 
 
For the deeper tunnels approaching the river on Contracts S4b 
and D3, the air pressures were not increased but maintained at 
less than the 15 psi limit, thus the increasing overburden 
forces were not proportionally balanced by an increase in air 
pressure. As a result, the overstress ratio, OSR, increased 
above 5 or 6, the clay squeezed, and the surface settlement 
volume, Vs, increased. The deeper tunnels showed larger 
surface settlements, Ss, than the shallower tunnels, despite the 
fact that the increased depth spread the surface settlement over 
a larger trough width.  As Peck recommended, in the absence 
of increased air pressures, the deeper tunnels required more 
stringent measures to install the liner plates and ribs early and 
tight to the clay in order to reduce settlements. Apparently, 
this recommendation was followed in the NB D-3 tunnel at 
Sta. 118, where Vs% was 1.8% despite the greater depth.  
 
 
WASHINGTON METRO: 1970-1973 
                                                                                                        
It was in the classroom that we were introduced to soft ground 
tunneling, taught by Professor Peck from the perspective of 
his pioneering investigations on the Chicago Subway.  It 
wasn’t until I was a faculty member, directing the University 
of Illinois contract for geotechnical monitoring on Washington 
Metro Phase I soft ground tunnels and stations in rock caverns 
and braced excavations in soil that I had my first opportunity 
to be in the field with Ralph Peck.  He was a member of the 
Washington Metro Board of Consultants and would make it a 
point, early in the morning prior to board meetings, to walk 
with us through the construction sites.  I recall a bright winter 
morning in 1972; Bill Hansmire and I picked up Ralph Peck at 
his hotel and we went down into the heading of the shield 
tunnel on Contract A-2.  We then came out of the shaft, 
crossed Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, and 
walked to our array of extensometers and inclinometers in the 
middle of Lafayette Square where we discussed our 
monitoring  results and observations,  the topic of Bill’s thesis. 
At the start of our soft ground tunneling experience, we were 
receiving the benefit of 30 years of tunnel observations. What 
a valuable experience those visits were for us, but I expect that 
Ralph Peck valued them as well. No matter how many board 
rooms he sat in over the years, his priority was to go to the 
site, observe and listen. 
 
The Washington Metro investigation built on the Chicago 
Subway experience of observing and recording construction 
events and correlating the volume of ground loss with the 
volume of surface settlement. In Chicago, the volume of 
ground loss was measured within the tunnel. On the 
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Washington Metro, the ground loss and three-dimensional 
distribution of ground movements was measured with 
borehole extensometers and inclinometers surrounding the 
advancing tunnel shield.  Just in time for use on our test 
section, Stan Wilson, inventor of the slope indicator and 
partner in Shannon and Wilson, Inc. and Slope Indicator Co., , 
informed us that  the Digitilt inclinometer, using a servo-
accelerometer to measure tilt, had been developed.  It was 
capable of measuring slopes with a precision of 1/10,000, an 
order of magnitude better than could be measured with then-
existing slope indicators, and precise enough to measure 
lateral displacements around braced excavations and tunnels.  
The inclinometer was immediately incorporated into our 
instrumentation plans  for the tunnels and  braced excavations. 
 
The digger shield had an open face which, in some cases, 
could result in inflows and ground loss, but also provided the 
opportunity to observe the ground and its behavior.  The soils 
were Terrace deposits of stiff clay and dense sand. The tunnel 
support consisted of 6 in. circular steel ribs spaced 4 ft on 
center with timber lagging between the ribs, which were 
installed inside the tail section of the shield and then expanded 
against the ground as the shield advanced forward.    
 
Digital readouts of machine functions did not exist at the time, 
so Bill Hansmire, was in the tunnel recording items the shield 
plumb bob readings and the position of the laser line on the 
two clear plastic targets on the front and back of the shield to 
determine the position of the shield and its angle of attack. 
The data showed that the shield was inclined at an angle in 
excess of tunnel grade, 12 in. higher at the front than the back 
end of the shield  in order to maintain grade with the extended 
hood, which gave the shield a tendency to dive. He also kept 
track of the location and the time that the shield was shoved 
and called the information up to those reading the inclinometer 
immediately in front of the tunnel shield to make sure that the 
inclinometer torpedo was pulled out of the casing before the 
shield cut through it so that the torpedo did not end up being 
excavated with the muck.  
  
By measuring the instruments at least once during every 4-foot 
shove of the shield, the source of the ground loss could be 
pinpointed (Fig. 13).  The large 6-in. surface settlement did 
not occur due to soil displacing into the open face of the shield 
as might have been expected, but was occurring over the 
shield. Almost every shove of the shield was causing large 
settlement of the extensometer anchor located immediately 
above the shield. From the front to the back of the shield, the 
deep settlement totaled 13 in. (Cording and Hansmire, 1975). 
 
The inclinometer in the path of the shield showed a lateral 
displacement of only 1/4 in. toward the face, confirming that 
the ground movement into the face was small and was not the 
source of the large ground losses (Fig. 13).   
Based on the observations on the first tunnel drive, the 
contractor rebuilt the shield hood for the second drive, so that 
the shield could be driven on grade without plowing. As a 
result, surface settlements were reduced from 6 to 2 in.         
 
Fig. 13: Washington, D.C. Metro, Contract A2, Lafayette 





GROUND CONTROL WITH ADVANCES IN SHIELD 
TUNNELING METHODS  
 
The standard set on the Chicago subway squeeze tests was to 
continuously monitor and observe both ground behavior and 
construction conditions in the liner plate tunnels. The 
Washington Metro test sections set a standard for monitoring 
ground movements around an advancing shield.  
 
A revolution in ground control has been developing since  the 
advent of  pressurized face shields (earth pressure balance or 
slurry shields) and it continues with  improved understanding 
of the machine functions that must be controlled and 
monitored to achieve ground control.  The understanding is 
aided by use of observational approaches pioneered on the 
Chicago subway and used on the Washington Metro.   
 
Observations have gone from timing and recording 
construction events in notebooks to digitally recording key 
machine functions in real time and archiving them for future 
use.  Pressurized face shields have a chamber behind the 
cutterhead in which the conditioned muck is held at pressures 
that balance groundwater and effective earth pressures, 
reducing the risk and magnitude of ground loss. The ground in 
the face cannot be regularly observed and reliance must be 
placed on the digital record.    
 
The digital information is comprehensive and outstanding and 
can be overwhelming.  However, in the past few years, 
manufacturers, owner’s representatives, and contractors have 
improved the use and understanding of the key machine 
functions controlling ground movements.   Contractors have 
engaged their engineers and operators in a team effort to set 
target levels for the key functions controlling ground behavior, 
and adjust and respond in real time to the conditions 
encountered.   
 
The following paragraphs summarize improvements in ground 
control and reductions in ground loss that have been achieved 
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in the past 70 years.  Ground loss, VL, as it was described by 
Peck in 1939, is the volume of ground that moves into the 
tunnel perimeter. The volume of the surface settlement trough, 
Vs, =  VL-- V where V is an increase in volume of the soil 
mass.   For  dense sands, a significant expansion of the soil 
above the tunnel can occur.  For soft clays, consolidation will 
cause a reduction in volume.  Most of the tunneling industry 
reports the percentage of ground loss as the volume of the 
surface settlement trough with respect to the tunnel volume. 
However, measurement of deep settlements with 
extensometers allows VL to be estimated as the shield passes, 
so that an understanding of the sources of ground loss and the 
effects of volume change in the soil mass can be assessed. 
Examples of surface settlement volumes percentages that have 
been achieved in the past 70 years are summarized below.  
 
1939:  Chicago subway:  Squeeze tests led to a reduction in 
surface settlement from approximately 6 in. to 2 in., and Vs% 
reduced from 5% to 2%.  
 
1972: Washington Metro:  Extensometers and inclinometers 
showed that ground loss of 5% on the first tunnel drive 
occurred over the shield, and was subsequently reduced to 2% 
on the 2
nd
 drive.  
 
1994-2000:  Evanston sewer tunnels, in deep deposit of soft 
Chicago Clay, Piezometers as well as extensometers and 
inclinometers showed the causes of consolidation during 
tunneling. 12-ft-dia wheeled excavator shield, 4 in. steel ribs, 
4 ft on center with timber lagging: Following was observed for 
the 60’ deep tunnel (Srisirirojanakorn, 2005): 
 
1. Immediate ground loss, largely due to 3/ 4” overcut:  
 Surface settlement, Ss = 0.8 to 1.2” (Volume of overcut 
gap is always lost on non-pressurized shields). 
2. Test section 3: Consolidation due to stress change and 
drainage through the permeable lining:  
   Additional time-dependent settlement: Ss =1.3” 
 VL +V = 5 cu ft/ft + 8 cu ft/ft; Vs=14  cu ft/ft.  
3. Test Section 4: Drainage prevented by placing a 
membrane around the steel ribs and lagging. 
Consolidation due to stress change only 
   Additional time dependent settlement: Ss =1.0” 
 VL +V = 4 cu ft/ft + 4 cu ft/ft = 10 cu ft/ft    
 
2000: In recent years designers on a number of tunnel projects 
have assumed that ground losses, Vs, of 1% can be achieved 
with pressurized face tunneling, based on a review of previous 
experience. For a transit tunnel at depths of approximately two 
or three diameters, this typically results in surface settlements 
on the order of one inch.  In some of these cases, additional 
ground control measures, such as compensation grouting, are 
used to further reduce the settlements beneath structures.  
 
2006: On the 1.8 miles of twin tunnel on the Los Angeles 
Metro Gold Line Eastside Extension, surface settlements were 
in the range of 0 to 0.3 in. over the entire alignment, giving a 
surface volume typically less than 0.25%. Although 
compensation grouting was installed beneath structures near 
the start of the tunnel drive, it did not need to be used. As a 
result of this and other recent EPBM experience, design values 
for maximum ground loss (Vs%) on several current projects 
have been reduced to 0.5% or less, and expectations are that 
smaller ground losses can be regularly achieved. 
 
Extensometers to measure ground loss immediately above the 
shield are being used on many projects, but often, the 
frequency of measurements has not been sufficient to locate 
the sources of the ground loss around the shield and results are 
not correlated with the key machine functions that limit 
ground loss. Without understanding what controls ground loss, 
the designer is reduced to estimating it based on summaries 
from other projects. The approach does not lead to an 
understanding of the requirements for controlling ground loss 
in different ground conditions.  Uncertainty regarding the 
ground control that the contractor can achieve in the tunnel 
may lead to specification of additional ground control 
measures such as compensation grouting. Observations on the 
following two projects provided detailed information on the 
EPBM functions that limited ground loss to negligible values.  
 
2011-2012: EBP tunnels in Seattle and Toronto: 
comprehensive test sections were established prior to passing 
beneath structures; in the first  case to verify that settlement 
over the shield was prevented by filling and pressurizing the  
large overcut gap with conditioned muck from the tunnel face 
(Diponio, et al, 2012), and in the second case to determine that 
the tunnels could be advanced at shallow depth beneath 
foundations of a structure without damaging settlement and 
without additional ground protection measures.   
.   
In both cases, machine functions were continuously read that 
showed not only that face pressures were consistently 
maintained within target levels both during and after shoving 
of the shield, but pressures were read and samples taken in the 
gap around the body of the shield showing that it was 
immediately filled and pressurized with conditioned muck or 
bentonite. was injected into the gap.  Finally, as is now 
standard in pressurized face shield tunneling, grout was 
continuously injected through the tail of the shield to fill and 
pressurize the gap between the shield and the segmental lining 
as the shield advanced. Thus a pressurized envelope was being 
maintained at all times around the entire shield.   
 
Machine monitoring data were correlated with continuous 
monitoring of ground behavior as the tunnel shield approached 
and passed the test sections– extensometers and surveys for 
settlements and piezometers to monitor the advancing pressure 
wave in the ground water. Ground losses of zero to 0.15%, 
were consistently achieved, and tunneling beneath the 
structures was accomplished without significant settlement 
and with no damage.  
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CHICAGO SUBWAY INVESTIGATIONS SET THE 
STANDARD    
 
For the past 70 years, the pioneering work of Karl Terzaghi 
and Ralph Peck and the Chicago Subway Soil Mechanics 
Laboratory has set the standard for the investigation and 
control of ground movements due to tunneling, and for 
geotechnical investigations, in general.  Peck stated it well in 
his keynote speech at the Geo-Engineering Conference in 
Urbana,   “The Chicago Subway project in the annals of 
geotechnical engineering assumed an importance far beyond 
its benefits at the time, largely because it demonstrated the 
enormous practical benefits that occur from even crude 
observations, crude at least in comparison to today’s 
sophisticated instrumentation.  Even today, it exemplifies the 
benefits that may be derived from simple but intelligently 
interpreted observations” (Peck, 1999).   
 
He went on to say:  “I have had a 60-year love affair with 
subway tunnels.  The state of the art has changed radically but 
the rate of change has not perceptibly decreased... most of the 
changes have not been drive by advances in theory, but by 
observations based on experience.” 
 
Throughout his career, Peck was a practicing engineer and an 
educator; the two were inseparable. It was apparent that he 
considered teaching --from theory to practice-- the most 
important part of his University life. He believed that 
judgment, or its foundations, could be taught: “There is 
actually such a thing as engineering judgment and it is 
indispensable to the successful practice of engineering.”  
 
Professor Peck communicated those principles in the 
classroom: when we finished his case history course we had 
served on his Board of Consultants, participating with him on 
virtual tours of his projects, observing, and making 
engineering judgments. They were like detective stories; we 
observed clues about the ground and its behavior; and I 
wanted to solve them.  
 
Forty years ago, on the Washington Metro, I and a whole 
generation of our graduate students had the opportunity to 
begin our love affair with subways, and subsequent 
generations of students have followed.  Over the years, many 
of us, former students and engineering colleagues, had the 
privilege of working with Ralph Peck on subways and many 
other projects. His presence is missed, his lessons remain. In 
commemorating Ralph B. Peck’s legacy we remind ourselves 
of -- and introduce others to -- the lessons he learned and 
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